The web hosting industry has long operated in isolated silos. Because the internet is fundamentally a distributed network, registrars manage domain names, domain registries maintain top-level domains, DNS providers route traffic, and hosting providers manage server infrastructure independently. While this decentralized architecture has allowed the web to grow exponentially over the last three decades, it has also created a major vulnerability: when a cyberattack or malicious campaign strikes one part of the infrastructure stack, operators are often forced to fight back in isolation.
To address this critical gap in cross-industry defense, the Internet Infrastructure Forum (IIF)—alongside initiatives like the Secure Hosting Alliance—is working to build a unified framework for real-time intelligence sharing and collaborative abuse reporting. Led by industry veteran David Snead, these organizations are striving to connect registrars, registries, cloud providers, and hosting companies to help the entire web ecosystem detect, track, and stop malicious attacks faster than adversaries can adapt.
A Career Spanning the Evolution of Web Hosting
David Snead’s involvement in the web infrastructure sector dates back to 1999, an era he describes as a time when hosting was still considered cutting-edge. Starting out as legal counsel for one of the earliest shared hosting pioneers, Snead went on to build a multi-decade career working with more than 50 different hosting companies. Over the years, he transitioned from drafting standard legal agreements to tackling larger structural challenges facing the industry.
In response to proposed legislation in the United States that threatened to severely impact internet service providers, Snead co-founded the i2Coalition alongside colleague Christian Dawson. Later, he served for a decade as in-house counsel for cPanel and WebPros before shifting his focus to his current role leading the Secure Hosting Alliance.
Snead notes that the hosting sector has a unique gravitational pull, often likened to the "Hotel California"—once professionals enter the industry, they rarely leave. Today, alongside his work with the Secure Hosting Alliance, Snead frequently assists early-stage hosting founders through mergers and acquisitions as smaller providers look toward consolidation with larger players.
Why the Web Infrastructure Stack Needs Collaborative Defense
The primary motivation behind the IIF is addressing a fundamental inefficiency in how abuse is handled across the web. Currently, internet infrastructure providers manage security incidents separately, resulting in redundant efforts and delayed responses. Snead explains that the IIF—facilitated by the Internet and Jurisdiction Foundation based in Paris—operates as a voluntary, cross-industry organization designed to break down these traditional silos.
The initiative brings together every layer of the infrastructure stack, from domain registrars and DNS providers to enterprise cloud and web hosting companies. By establishing a centralized, common protocol for submitting abuse data, the IIF aims to streamline how critical threat information is distributed.
In its current prototype phase, the IIF is testing a mechanism where participants submit basic, non-proprietary abuse data—such as timestamps, domain names, and originating IP addresses—to a central secretariat. The secretariat then enriches this data by cross-referencing it with submissions from other entities across the stack, ensuring that the correct hosting provider or registrar receives actionable intelligence immediately.
While the project is currently in a controlled testing phase, organizers are carefully evaluating the architecture to ensure it scales effectively. Although some stakeholders argue for a rapid, widespread rollout across the entire global infrastructure market, technical and operational groups are methodically testing the system with a smaller cohort of organizations to iron out logistical and operational wrinkles.
Tackling Specific Threats: The Test Case of Fake Shops
To prove the viability of real-time intelligence sharing, the IIF has focused its initial testing on a specific, widespread abuse vector: fraudulent e-commerce sites, commonly referred to as "fake shops," which are frequently used for credential harvesting and financial scams.
For many hosting companies, particularly smaller operators with limited internal resources, managing abuse complaints generated by fraudulent sites can quickly become an overwhelming burden. While large enterprise hosting providers maintain extensive security teams capable of absorbing massive waves of abuse notifications, a smaller host operating with a fraction of that workforce can see its daily operations disrupted by a single malicious storefront. Beyond tying up valuable customer support and abuse team resources, hosting fake shops can also negatively impact a provider’s merchant reputation, leading to higher payment processing fees and wasted server bandwidth.
Snead emphasizes that presenting a compelling business case is far more effective than relying purely on moral persuasion when encouraging companies to participate in collaborative security efforts. When hosting providers realize that sharing actionable threat intelligence directly protects their bottom line and reduces administrative overhead, they are much more likely to engage with industry-wide initiatives.
Navigating Jurisdictional and Technical Realities
Implementing a global intelligence-sharing network introduces complex technical and legal challenges. Information that can be shared freely under regulatory frameworks in the United States may face strict limitations under data protection laws in the European Union, India, Brazil, or other international jurisdictions.
To address these hurdles, specialized working groups within the initiative are analyzing the legal nuances of cross-border data sharing. Snead notes that the data being shared is intentionally kept non-proprietary and non-confidential. By focusing on abstract, standardized indicators—such as domain names, IP addresses, and structured reporting formats like xarf—the IIF minimizes privacy risks while maximizing operational utility.
Technically, the initiative relies on standardized APIs and automated file feeds, designed to give participating hosting providers 24/7 access to enriched threat data that can be easily integrated into their existing internal systems.
The Role of the Secure Hosting Alliance and Trust Seals
While the IIF focuses primarily on operational abuse reporting and real-time infrastructure intelligence, the Secure Hosting Alliance addresses professionalism, ethics, and industry standards through its dedicated trust seal program.
Celebrating over a year of active growth, the Secure Hosting Alliance has expanded its membership significantly, growing from a handful of charter members to dozens of participating hosting providers, security vendors, and certified partners. The organization is also looking ahead to 2027, with plans to introduce a specialized trust seal tailored for security vendors who provide services to the hosting sector.
The trust seal acts as a valuable differentiator for hosting companies, particularly in an era where regulatory scrutiny over online content is increasing. By meeting rigorous certification standards—such as providing clear, customer-friendly contracts before a user signs up rather than hiding terms behind obscure hyperlinks—certified hosts can demonstrate a tangible commitment to transparency and security.
For web agencies, freelancers, and developers who rely heavily on stable, secure hosting environments, these credentials offer a reliable metric when evaluating potential infrastructure partners.
Building a Sustainable, Industry-Led Future
As the Secure Hosting Alliance and the Internet Infrastructure Forum continue to expand their reach, organizers are actively engaging with hosting providers, registrars, and digital agencies across the globe. Membership in the initiative is structured around self-reported revenue, keeping financial commitments accessible for small and medium-sized hosting companies looking to benefit from shared intelligence.
Despite the natural commercial competition that exists between commercial hosting providers, Snead highlights that the infrastructure community has a long-standing tradition of putting competitive differences aside when it comes to security, stability, and abuse mitigation. By fostering an environment of rough consensus and mutual support, these collaborative efforts aim to build a more resilient web infrastructure capable of withstanding emerging threats far more effectively than any single provider could manage alone.
